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Abstract Increasingly, large tech firms dominate eco-systems.

From a societal perspective this is not always beneficial since
these companies behave as value extractors; they charge an
unreasonable high fee for their services and they can do so
because they are monopolists. A possible solution to this
substantial power concentration can be decentralized ecosystems, e.g., enabled by blockchain technology, in which
decision power is distributed fairly. However, this comes also
with the requirement that such eco-systems need a decentralized
governance model. This paper explores if such a governance
model can be represented by conceptual models, in particular,
e3value. We answer this question by designing a decentralized
eco-system in the field of electricity supply, which enables peer
to peer energy trading, and checking if important governance
decisions, motivated by a systematic literature review, can be
represented.
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1

Introduction

Nearly every company and individual is part of at least one eco-system. Based on
(Moore, 1996), we define an ecosystem as a collection of parties who work
cooperatively and competitively to satisfy customer needs. Well known examples of
eco-systems are Uber, Google, and Facebook. All these eco-systems are dominated
by only one player.
Such eco-systems with a dominant player tend to do value extraction: Companies
charge unreasonably high fees for providing services or goods, which is neither in
the interest of, nor sustainable for society. To mitigate unfair value extraction, we
propose the concept of decentralized eco-systems, which we define as a collection of
parties who work cooperatively and competitively to satisfy customer needs, and in
which decision power is fairly distributed over a (sub)set of parties in the eco-system.
Such decentralized eco-systems, specifically in the field of intensive information
services, can be realized with Distributed Ledger (DLT) and Blockchain (BCT)
Technology. The most well-known case of BCT is the Bitcoin, in which banks are
disrupted by allowing customers and sellers to directly transact with each other,
without a bank. In general, BCT enables decentralized business transactions between
parties, without a powerful centralized party. However, governance of many BCT
systems are poorly developed and is often an ad-hoc driven process. Bitcoin has
some signs of a governance process, but the nodes play only a role at the very end
of this process, namely by accepting or rejecting the revised Bitcoin protocol.
To enable a decentralized eco-system, the key question is: How to govern and design
a decentralized eco-system? In a traditional eco-system, the focal company is
governed hierarchically by its board of directors and control, shareholders, and
ultimately the government. In decentralized eco-systems, governance evolves to a
negotiation game between participants, rather than a hierarchical top-down decision
process.
Based on our consultancy experience with decentralized business development
projects we have seen that these projects usually do not have a sound governance
system in place; in practice, the decentralized project is often driven and governed
by one single enterprise, which is often also the technology provider. For
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decentralized eco-systems, this is not in line with the philosophy that decision power
should be equally and fairly distributed over parties in the eco-system. Even the
strongest supporters of adopting a decentralized eco-system have conceded that the
biggest challenge is the design of distributed governance (Zachariadis, 2019) and
consider decentralized governance is an emerging research field (Alves, 2017).
The specific research question in this paper is to what extent governance decisions
can be represented by conceptual models, in particular, e3value. The goal of
conceptual models is to precisely and unambiguously represent an artefact in reality
with the aim for (automated) analysis. This is precisely our long-term research
objective: We want to software-support the design and analysis of governance
constructs, and we refer to this field as computational governance.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we briefly explain what we mean by
BCT-enabled decentralized eco-systems, and we elaborate on the notion of
‘governance’. Then we explain in Sec. 3 our research methodology, which is
Exploratory Technical Action Research (ETAR). A crucial element in ETAR in the
involvement in a real-life project, which in our case, is a project about decentralized
enabled renewable energy trading (Sec. 4). Finally, Sec. 5 presents our conclusions.
2

Governance of decentralized eco-systems

To understand governance and its layers, we revise the generic control paradigm of
Blumenthal (see e.g., (Bemelmans, 1994) and (Leeuw, de, 1973)) to arrive at a more
specific governance paradigm (see Fig. 1). We distinguish three governance systems: (1)
the governed system (operations of a company) that has to obey to rules set by the
governing system (e.g. the management of that same company), (2) the governing
system that monitors and steers the governed system, and (3) the meta governing
system that controls the governing system (e.g. the government of a country).
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Figure 1: The governance paradigm

The rules are normative, e.g., the governed system should comply with these rules.
(Re)design of rules is based on the monitoring of the governed system. The governed
system performs value-adding operations, such as providing a video stream to customers
in return for money (in the case of e.g. Netflix). The meta-governance system
prescribes the rules for making rules (by the governance system). This implies that
the governance system is a governed system at the same time. It is important that
we understand the system as in system’s theory: A system consists of entities with
relationships. In our work (see also the next section), the governed system is a
decentralized network of enterprises (e.g., a networked value constellation (Normann &
Ramírez, 1993) or an eco-system (Moore, 1996)).
3

Exploratory Technical Action Research

We are interested in how to design governance for decentralized eco-systems and to
what extent the governance of such eco-systems can be expressed in an e3value
model. Often, ‘decentralized governance’ is considered ex-post, that is when
governance is already in place and up for evaluation. In contrast, we study the topic
ex-ante, e.g., as a topic of design, cf. (Erbguth & Morin, 2018). Concretely, we do so
by means of a project about renewable energy that facilitates peer-to-peer energy
trading. We have been actively involved in this project. We use Exploratory
Technical Action Research (ETAR), following the TAR approach, which is often
used in the field of Design Sciences (Wieringa, 2014). ETAR comprises the following
activities: (1) problem analysis, (2) treatment design, (3) treatment, and (4) treatment
analysis. The notion of ‘exploratory’ emphasizes that we use TAR to first understand
decentralized governance better, which might be followed by one or more TAR
engagements with the field with the goal of theory formation and evaluation of the
validity of the theory.
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Governance for peer-to-peer energy trading

4.1

Project background
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We have been working on energy transition towards renewable energy project that
facilitates peer-to-peer energy trading. In The Netherlands, private citizens who have
photo-voltaic (PV) cells, currently may subtract the generated electricity from the
consumed electricity and only pay for the net amount of consumed electricity.
Effectively, the owner receives the electricity price for sold electricity that should be
paid normally, if he buys electricity (in The Netherlands about 0,20 Euro/KWh).
During day-time, when the sun shines, the owner may generate more electricity than
he needs and sells the surplus to the net. At night, the opposite happens.
Consequently, the electricity grid functions as a kind of store: if the PV cell owner
has a surplus, it can be delivered to the grid, and if he has a shortage, he can obtain
electricity from the net, and the owner pays only for the net energy bought measured
over one year.
This storage is offered free of charge, while for the large scale electricity suppliers
and power generators who provice this service, it is not free at all. Due to physical
constraints, the amount of electricity generated in a grid should at all times equal the
amount of electricity consumed. The large electricity suppliers and generators are
responsible for keeping this balance, and they do so by switching on and off
generators and loads if demand and supply requires that. Obviously, this flexibility
does not come for free, and therefore large electricity providers complain about the
attractive arrangements for private owners of PV cells.
As a result, the Dutch government has decided to depreciate the current
arrangement gradually. In the new situation, owners of PV cells directly receive a fee
if they deliver to the grid. This fee is expected to be substantially lower than the 0.20
Euro/KWh mentioned earlier (e.g. 0.06 Euro/KWh). The same happens if
electricity needs to be bought. It is not allowed anymore to settle generated and
consumed electricity over the period of one year.
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To mitigate the decrease in revenue for private owners of PV cells, we have designed
an innovative, peer-to-peer business model for energy trading. If a private owner has
a surplus of energy, he first sells it to another private owner. In case of shortage,
owners buy electricity first from their peers. In case all participating owners have
sufficient electricity, the surplus can be sold to the electricity market, as proposed by
the government. In case of a shortage, owners buy electricity from the electricity
market.
4.2

Problem analysis

The problem at hand is how to design governance in a decentralized eco-system. In
Design Science, the notion of artefacts is key. We express artefacts in terms of
conceptual models (Brodie, Mylopoulos, & Schmidt, 2012). These models allow for
a better and shared understanding of the domain at hand and facilitates automated
proof of correctness of models and computer-assisted analysis of the domain at hand
(e.g., compliance with governance rules set by law). We want to understand whether
model-based artefacts can assist in designing and understanding governance in
decentralized eco-systems.
4.3

Treatment design: Governance artefacts

One of the first questions in terms of Design Science (Hevner et al., 2004) is what
the actual design artefacts are. Without having the intention to be complete, based
on our previous experience with eco-system design projects, and inspired on
(Wieringa, Engelsman, Gordijn, & Ionita, 2019), we propose at least the following
artefacts:
• The strategy artefact: Identifies the participants (as governing parties), rule,
regulation, and lawmakers (as governing parties), their capabilities, and the
services and products offered and requested. It provides a high-level blueprint of
the eco-system at hand. Such models can be expressed by e.g., the UML Business
Motivation Model (BMM) (BMM 2015) or i* to represent the strategic intent of
stakeholders (Yu, 1997).
• The business model artefact: Puts into operation the strategy of the ecosystem, in terms of flows of valuable objects. It also addresses economic
reciprocity. Such models can be represented by e.g., e3value (Gordijn &
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Akkermans, 2018), the Resource Event Agent (REA) ontology (Geerts,
Mccarthy, Andersen, Dunn, & Smith David, 1999), and the Value Delivery
Modeling Language (VDML) (VDML 2018).
• The business process & data artefacts: These artefacts represent the
processes, time-ordering of activities, the performance of these by resources, and
interaction between activities, in terms of message flows. Also expressed is a
domain model of the relevant entities, relationships, and properties. There are
many possibilities to represent these artefacts, we refer here to the Business
Process and Model Notation (BPMN) (BPMN 2013) and the Unified Modelling
Language (UML), more specifically class diagrams (Seidl, Scholz, Huemer, &
Kappel, 2015).
• The IT artefact: This artefact encloses a number of sub-artefacts, e.g., the
relevant views of the UML (Seidl et al., 2015), such as class-, activity, state
transition- and deployment models. The focus is on embodying the previous
artefacts into IT components.
These artefacts become governance artefacts as soon as they are prescriptive,
meaning that they set the rules for the partipants. All these artefacts can play that
role.
Designing all artefacts is a significant amount of work that exceeds the reporting
space in this paper. Therefore, we concentrate on the business model artefact. The
strategy artefact was already known when we entered the project, namely cost
reduction for PV cell owners as soon as the new energy regulation starts. The other
artefacts follow once there is agreement about the business model.
4.4

Treatment: A peer-to-peer energy business model expressing
governance decisions

The project consortium consists of an energy certification body, a research institute,
and a BCT platform provider. To express the business model, we require a language
and we have chosen for the e3value methodology (Gordijn & Akkermans, 2018). This
a tractable and teachable method for business development specifically designed for
eco-systems. Note that the traditional energy infrastructure is hierarchically and
centrally orchestrated, therefore it does not provide decentralized governance for
the case at hand. Consequenty, a new governance model is needed.
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In figure 2, we model the business model for the peer-to-peer energy trading
ecosystem, expressed as an e3value model. The model is the outcome of several
workshops with stakeholders but is simplified (some parties are left out) to allow for
a compact presentation in this paper. Prosumers are market segments because there are
many of them (e.g. households). Prosumers own PV cells and likely batteries (e.g.,
in their electric cars) to store electricity temporally. A market segment is a set of
homegenous actors. Actors are also economically independent parties, such as the
Cooperation and the Electricity Trader. The Cooperation aggregates electricity
power from Prosumers and can, therefore, negotiate a better deal with the Trader.
In the same way, the Trader delivers electricity against favourable conditions to
Prosumers via the Cooperation if there is not enough electricity generated by the
Prosumers themselves. As can be seen from the model, the Prosumer uses first
energy (‘consume’ value activity) from its own PC cells and/or batteries.

Figure 2: Peer-to-Peer Energy trading
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Similarly, if the Trader generates more electricity than it requires, it first stores the
energy in a battery component. If there is still a surplus of electricity, the Prosumer
sells electricity to other Prosumers: the peers. The same happens if a Prosumer
consumes more than it can obtain from its PC cells or batteries; then, it first obtains
electricity from other Prosumers. To be attractive to all parties, the peer-to-peer
electricity price should be higher than the price the Trader would pay while buying
(so more than 0.06 Euro/KWh) but lower than the price the Trader charge while
selling (so lower than 0.20 Euro/KWh). This gives sufficient price negotiations
between Prosumers (peers). This represents the peer-to-peer trading. Furthermore, the
Cooperation provides a service to the Prosumers, namely an IT-enabled energy
trading platform. Part of the service is (dis)aggregation of electricity to the trader, to
sell a surplus of electricity of the Prosumers, or to buy electricity for the Prosumers
in case the Prosumer do no have sufficient electricity himself. This way, the
Cooperation ensures that at all time the supply and demand of electricity are in
balance, which is a requirement for the electricity grid.
4.5

Treatment analysis: Governance decisions in the peer-to-peer
business model

In terms of treatment analysis, the question is whether a business model represents
governance decisions adequately. In (Alves, 2017), a number of governance
mechanisms have been identified based on a systematic literature review of 63
studies on governance for eco-systems. The study of (Alves, 2017) focuses on ecosystems with one dominant actor, which differs from a decentralized eco-system.
However, we consider the study as an useful starting point because most of these
mechanisms are also applicable to decentralized eco-systems.
In (Alves, 2017), three classes of governance mechanisms are identified that can be
used to design governance in eco-systems: (1) value creation, (2) coordination of
players, and (3) organizational openness & control. Each class of governance
mechanism has subclasses (see below). We use these governance mechanisms to
evaluate per governance mechanisms to what extent our e3value model for peer-topeer energy trading (see Fig. 2) represents the governance decisions.
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Value creation evalution based on our e3value model.
The value creation aspect considers how value is created and distributed.
• Revenue model. The revenue model shows how each actor earns money. In the
e3value model, this is shown by means of value transfers. In the peer-to-peer
energy trading case, a Prosumer pays a lower price for electricity than the fee a
Trader would charge.
• Attract and maintain partners. The electricity case has a close resemblance to the
idea of partnering. Effectively, partners (the Prosumers) team up to provide each
other electricity and act as one to the electricity market if there is a surplus of
shortage in electricity. This partnership can not easily be observed in the e3value
model, because in e3value, a partnership has a different meaning, namely two or
more actors offering or requesting objects of value together as one proposition.
• Stimulate co-investments and share costs. Each Prosumer has to invest in
technology to participate in the eco-system. Although not visible in the graphical
model, this can be represented to quantify the model, which is a standard feature
of the e3value method. For shared-costs, all Prosumers contribute to the financial
sustainability of the Cooperation. This can be seen from the value transfer "peerto-peer trading".
Coordination of players evalution based on our e3value model.
Parties in an eco-system should work together in a harmonized way.
• Roles and responsibilities. A governance decision is to have a cooperation and
not only Prosumers. A truly peer-to-peer system would not have a cooperation.
However, the Cooperation represents all Prosumers, and these should have a say
in the decision making processes of the cooperation. The e3value model does not
represent this, e.g., does not model that a party is represented by some other
party for decision making. This could be an extension of the e3value language (see
e.g., (Sarkar & Gordijn, 2018) for a proposal on how to do this). Furthermore,
value activities can represent the roles of actors. The model presents only value
activities to distinguish between the consumption of electricity and the
generation and storage of electricity. This is needed to represent that buyers first
'buy' electricity from themselves before buying electricity from their peers or
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Cooperation. Value activities could be added to the other actors to emphasize
the roles they take.
• Effective communication channels. The peer-to-peer electricity trading ecosystem is supported by information technology, more specifically BCT, to avoid
the emergence of a central party. Communication is not represented by an e3value
model; other artefacts must be developed to represent this.
• Conflict management. In any eco-system, conflicts can arise, and in peer-to-peer
eco-system there is no centralized party that can resolve conflicts. Conflict
management is a topic by itself, it can be seen as a commercial service (then it
would be visible in the e3value model), but also as an inter-organizational business
process, and hence be modelled by a business process artefact.
• Manage resources, risk, and expectations. Resources (e.g., a capacity to perform
activities) can be seen by the value activities as assigned to actors. Risks and
expectations can be analyzed by the e3value model by quantifying it and then
performing what-if analyses.
Organizational openness and control evalution based on our e3value model.
Eco-systems can be open (or closed) to their environment, e.g., of actors that may
participate. Control refers to the actor(s) who orchestrate the eco-system.
• Autonomy. In this case, autonomy would refer to the decision power of actors
in their own right. In the case of normal electricity consumption, the consumer
buys electricity from a large supplier and has no decision power . For the peerto-peer electricity case, decision power is with the cooperation. These processes
can not be seen by the e3value model.
• Distribution of power. The peer-to-peer electricity case distributes power equally
over the Prosumers. This can be seen from the e3value model. Prosumers are
depicted as the same kind of actor, and consequently, their need for electricity is
the same, as it is for generating electricity. Since Prosumers are part of a market
segment, they assign economic value to electricity in the same way.
Quantification would illustrate that Prosumers earn and spend the same amount
of money.
• Architectural decisions. The eco-system at hand requires an IT architecture, to
allow for interoperability between all parties. This is not illustrated by the e3value
model.
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5

Conclusion

The question raised at the beginning of the paper is to what extent an e3value model
can present governance decisions. Concerning value creation, we have learned that
e3value represents decisions regarding the revenue model. However, partnering of
Prosumers can not really be represented in e3value, the notion of partnership needs
to be revisited, e.g., by introducing different kinds of partnerships. Investments and
cost-sharing can be represented if the model is quantified. Coordination of players
seems to be more a business process design issue than a business (value) model
concern. Roles and responsibilities can be partly represented by value activities; risk
and expectations by running what-if scenarios, which is a standard functionality of
the e3value toolset. An e3value model can partly visualize organizational openness and
control. Autonomy regarding the decision process can not easily be seen; the
distribution of power can be spotted in various ways. Architectural decisions require
IT modeling techniques, but also a commitment to standards to ensure interoperability. As a final remark, although an e3value model can represent some aspects
of governance decisions, the design process for e3value is focused on business
development: understanding the required eco-system, performing a financial
sustainability assessment and fraud analysis. The other layers of the eco-system
should be designed and analysed as well (such as control, ICT and powergrid layer).
For future research we plan to extend the peer-to-peer e3value model and to model
the other layers of decentralized governance as well.
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